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CRIMINAL LAW
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE?*
FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN**
By its express terms, the fourth amendment
does not provide for any remedy when evi-
dence has been obtained as a result of an ille-
gal search or seizure. The remedy the courts
have formulated to enforce the amendment,
first enunciated in Weeks v. United States,' is
commonly known as the "exclusionary rule." 2
The rule provides that evidence obtained in vi-
olation of the amendment cannot be used as
evidence in a criminal trial against a person
whose fourth amendment rights were violated.
In Weeks, the Court stated that without such a
rule, the amendment would be of "no value" to
those accused of crime and "might as well be
stricken from the Constitution." 3
The exclusionary rule has been criticized by
the judiciary4 and commentators 5 alike be-
* The opinions and conclusions presented herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily rep-
resent the views of The Judge Advocate General's
School or any other governmental agency.
** Major, JAGC, U.S. Army, Professor, The
Judge Advocate General's School. B.A., 1961,
Alfred University; J.D., 1964, State University of
New York at Buffalo; LL.M., 1970, S.J.D. candi-
date, George Washington University. Member of
New York Bar. The author would like to express
his appreciation to Captain Brian B. O'Neil for his
comments and research.
3.232 U.S. 383 (1914). For a history of the ex-
clusionary rule see an article by Chief Justice
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14
Al!. U.L. REv. 1, 4-10, 1964).
2 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Buearu of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 418
(1971), Chief Justice Burger refers to the remedy
as the "suppression doctrine."
3 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393
(1914).
4 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
5 Burger, supra note 1; Davidow, Criminal Pro-
cedure Ombudsman as a Substitute for the Exclu-
sionary Rule: A Proposal, 4 TEx. TECH. L. Rzv.
317 (1973); Roche, A Viable Substitute for the
Exchsionary Rule: A Civil Rights Appeals
Board, 30 WAsr. & LEE L. R1v. 223 (1973).
cause of its questionable utility. This relentless
attack, together with well-publicized, flagrant
violations of the fourth amendment, prompted
Congress to pass an amendment to the Federal
Tort Claims Act in March 1974. Basically, the
amendment allows an aggrieved party to sue
the federal government for some violations of
the fourth amendment by federal law enforce-
ment officials. At best the amendment appears
to be a necessary, albeit limited, experiment in
control of the police. It could also become a
remedy for only a very narrowly defined class
of cases, unfortunately having little or no ef-
fect on the law enforcement establishment. At
worst, the amendment, which only provides a
limited remedy, could be interpreted as a sub-
stitute for the exclusionary rule. This article
focuses briefly on the rationale behind and the
utility of the exclusionary rule, and then ana-
lyzes the amendment and its likely impact on
the criminal justice system.
I. THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The exclusionary rule as originally an-
nounced applied only to federal prosecutions
and was not applied to the states until 1961 in
Mapp v. OhioG In Mapp, the Court justified
its holding by placing some emphasis on the
"imperative of judicial integrity." 7 The Court
reasoned that the government had to play
fairly and should not be allowed to profit from
its illegal acts." Justice Black believed that the
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amend-
ment working with the fourth amendment jus-
G 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7 Id. at 659, quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
8 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469,
471 (1928) (dissenting opinions).
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tified the rule.9 The real reason behind the
rule, however, is the failure of police discipli-
nary procedures to effectively curb police mis-
conduct in the search and seizure area. "The
purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-
to compel respect for the Constitutional guar-
antee in the only effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it.'" 10 In
Linkletter v. Walker," the Court stated that
"the purpose [of the Mapp decision] was to
deter lawless action of the police." 12 Recently
in United States v. Calandra,"3 the Court
again stated that the exclusionary rule's "prime
purpose is to deter future unlawful police con-
duct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of
the Fourth Amendment." 14
The exclusionary rule is often justified on
the assumption that it does actually deter ille-
gal searches and seizures and that there is no
other alternative for controlling such
behavior.' 5 As will be shown, both of these as-
sumptions are of doubtful validity.
9 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-66 (1961)
(Black, J., concurring). See also Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 47-48 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886)
(dictum).
10 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961),
quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960). The lack of a federal remedy was a sub-
stantial factor in the Court's decision to impose
the exclusionary rule. Allen, Federalism and the
Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961
Sup. CT. Ry. 1, 2-20.
11 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
12 Id. at 637. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388, 413, 415 (1971) (Burger, C. J.,
dissenting); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969); Allen, Due Process and State Crimi-
nal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. Rxv.
16, 34 (1953); Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individ-
ual Liberties-Some "Facts and "Theories," 53 J.
CRim. L.C. & P.S. 171, 179 (1962); LaFave &
Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's
Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement
Decisions, 63 MicH. L. RV. 987, 1002-03 (1965);
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. Ci. L. Rv. 665, 667-72
(1970).
13 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
14 Id. at 347.
15 See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 413-14 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"The rule has rested on a theory that suppres-
sion of evidence in these circumstances was
imperative to deter law enforcement authori-
ties.... If an effective alternative remedy is
available, concern for official observance of the
law does not require adherence to the exclu-
sionary rule."
The first attempt to statistically justify the
rule was made by Justice Murphy in his dis-
sent in Wolf v. Colorado.'0 Analyzing data on
police training practices, he indicated that po-
lice training with respect to the fourth amend-
ment was extensive in cities in five of the six
states that had adopted the exclusionary rule.
He concluded: "The contrast between states
with the federal rule and those without it is
thus a positive demonstration of its efficacy." 17
Once the Court applied the rule to the states
it was not long before some of its members be-
came positive about its deterrent effect. In
Linkletter, Justice Clark referred to the exclu-
sionary rule as "the only effective deterrent
against lawless police action." 18 Chief Justice
Warren also praised the rule:
[I]ts major thrust is a deterrent one [citing
Linkletter], and experience has taught that it
is the only effective deterrent to police mis-
conduct in the criminal context.... 1
juxtaposed are the statements by other jus-
tices. In Irvine v. California,2" Justice Jackson
declared:
What actual experience teaches we really do
not know. Our cases evidence the fact that the
federal rule of exclusion and our reversal of
conviction for its violation are not sanctions
which put an end to illegal search and seizure
by federal officers.... There is no reliable evi-
dence known to us that inhabitants of those
states which exclude evidence suffer less from
lawless searches and seizures than those of
states that admit it.21
And Justice Stewart in Elkins v. United
States22 conceded that "[e]mpirical statistics
are not available" to show that the exclusion-
ary rule reduces the incidence of fourth
amendment violations.
It should be noted that there is evidence that
the exclusionary rule does work. The Wicker-
sham Report found in 1931 that the "third de-
16 338 U.S. 25, 41-47 (1949).
17 Id. at 46.
18 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636
(1965).
19 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). See
also People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905
(1955).
20 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
21 Id. at 135-36.
22 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
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gree" was extensively practiced, 23 but today
crude police techniques are less common. At
least arguably, the disappearance of the third
degree is due to the exclusionary rule," 4 how-
ever, its disappearance could also simply be
due to changing societal values.
There is also some proof that demonstrates
the ineffectiveness of the rule. James E.
Spiotto has concluded "the deterrent rationale
for the rule does not seem to be justified [by
the empirical study and] Canada's experience
with the tort remedy suggests that viable alter-
natives to the... rule do exist."' - This con-
clusion was the result of a detailed analysis of
Chicago search and seizures statistics.2 6 A
main factor supporting his conclusion was the
proportional increase in the motions to sup-
press in various categories of cases between
1950 and 1971.27 He reasoned that if the exclu-
sionary rule was an effective deterrent, the sta-
tistics would have shown a decrease in the mo-
tions to suppress. 28 The fallacy of this basic
assumption is demonstrated when one consid-
ers several other factors which may have been
functioning during this time period.
First, there has been an extension of the
right to privacy in a number of areas by the
Supreme Court.29 Also, young attorneys have
received much more extensive training in
criminal procedure than past generations"0 and
are consequently more aware of the values of
motions to suppress evidence. It is also possible
that attorneys for indigents may consciously or
unconsciously make the motion to increase the
fee paid by the government. All of these fac-
23 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE
& ENFORCEMENT (WICKERSHAM COMMISSION),
COMPLETE REPORTS 153 (1931).
24 Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the
Police, 52 TEX. L. REv. 703, 722 (1974).
25 Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-
Two Approaches: The Canadian Tort Remedy
and the U.S. Exclusionary Rule, 1 J. POL. ScI. &
ADMIN. 36, 49 (1973).
26 Spiotto, Search an, Seizure: An Empirical
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alterna-
tives, 2 3. oF LEGAL STuDIEs 243 (1973).
- Id. at 276.
28 Id.
29 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See also
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amend-
inent, 58 MINN. L. Rxv. 349, 475 n.593 (1974).
30 Larson, Book Review, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 341
(1970).
tors tend to undermine the foundation upon
which Spiotto's conclusions are built.
Most commentators have agreed that there is
no good data substantiating or refuting the de-
terrent effect of the rule,31 but even if the rule
does act as a deterrent, it seems unlikely that
it could have a significant impact. The fact
that the exclusionary rule only applies at the
actual trial of a criminal case tends to cut
down on its impact. In most cases, the police
are not concerned with convictions or even
prosecutions, 32 but rather with case clear-
ances, 33 the removal of contraband items such
as narcotics from circulation, 34 satisfying a
31 Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L. REv. 621
(1955); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Viola-
tions of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493
1955); Kamisar, Wolf & Lustig, Ten Years Lat-
er: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal
Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083 (1959); Oaks,
supra note 12, at 755; Wright, Must the Criminal
Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TFx. L.
REv. 736, 741 (1972) ; Comment, Use of § 1983 to
Remedy Unconstitutional Police Conduct: Guard-
ing the Guards, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHETS-Cv. Lm. L.
RPv. 104 (1970); Comment, The Decline of the
Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative to Injustice, 4
Sw. U.L. REv. 68 (1972) ; Comment, Federal In-
junctive Relief From Illegal Search, 1967 WASH.
U.L.Q. 104; Comment, The Federal Injunction as
a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78
YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
32 Oaks, supra note 12, at 720-21. See generally
H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL SANCTION
149-73 (1968); J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT
TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC So-
ciETY 164-81 (1966).
33 LaFave, Improving Police Performance
Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part 1: Current
Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REv.
391, 447 (1965); Wingo, Growing Disillusionment
with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. LJ. 573,
576-78 (1971) ; Wright, supra note 31, at 740.
34 Wingo, supra note 33, at 577. As Professor
LaFave observed:
Informed observers have suggested a variety
of goals or motivations other than obtaining
convictions that may prompt police arrest and
search and seizure. These include arrest or
confiscation as a punitive sanction (common in
gambling and liquor law violations), arrest
for the purpose of controlling prostitutes and
transvestites, arrest of an intoxicated person
for his own safety, search for the purpose of
recovering stolen property, arrest and search
and seizure for the purpose of "keeping the lid
on" in a high crime area or of satisfying pub-
lic outcry for visible enforcement, search for
the purpose of removing weapons or contra-
band such as narcotics from circulation and
search for weapons that might be used against
the searching officer. A large proportion of
police behavior is traceable to these reasons
19751
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public outcry for visible police enforcement,
and controlling potentially dangerous
situations.3 5 Consequently, law enforcement
personnel are not always affected adversely
when evidence is excluded. Aside from these
non-prosecutorial goals. of police action, the
rule generally only applies to contested cases 6
where, for example, the defendant does not
plead guilty. The rule does not, in effect, oper-
ate directly against the police officer, but
rather against the prosecutor, who rarely, if
ever, has any control over the officer's activi-
ties in the field.37 Neither the judge nor the
prosecutor adequately explains a court ruling on
the exclusionary rule so that it might be un-
derstood by the police officer. Obviously, the
officer cannot follow guidelines he does not
comprehend.
This lack of communication might possibly
be rectified by assigning police officers to
courtroom duty; these officers would then re-
port the results of such cases to other depart-
ment members. 39 However, this assumes that
police officers are equipped with knowledge to
make a meaningful report, but it is doubtful
for arrest and search and seizure and thus is
not likely to be responsive to any deterrent ef-
fect of the exclusionary rule.
LaFave, supra note 33, at 429, 443-44.
3 Oaks, supra note 12, at 728; Wingo, supra
note 33, at 577.
36 In many jurisdictions a guilty plea can con-
stitutionally waive a fourth amendment issue. See,
e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
37 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
416-17 (1971) ; Oaks, supra note 12, at 726. Con-
tra Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949)
(Murphy, J., dissenting).
The conclusion is inescapable that but one
remedy exists to deter violations of the search
and seizure clause. That is the rule which ex-
cludes illegally obtained evidence. Only by ex-
clusion can we impress upon the zealous pros-
ecutor that violation of the Constitution will
do him no good. And only when that point is
driven home can the prosecutor be expected to
emphasize the importance of observing consti-
tutional demands in his instructions to the po-
lice.
Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
38 LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police:
The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law
Enforcement Decisions, 63 Micn. L. REv. 987,
1005, 1012 (1965); LaFave, Improving Police
Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule, 30
Mo. L. REV. 391, 402-03, 415-21 (1965).
39 The PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADrIrSTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 33 (1967).
that even lawyers could accomplish this task
considering the inconsistency of many
opinions.40 Where seized evidence is held inad-
missible by an appellate court several years
after the search, it is questionable whether or
not there is any communication between the-
court and the officer.
Assuming for the sake of argument that all
the information in a particular state or federal'
jurisdiction is consistent and conveyed to the
police officer, it is still not clear whether the
information would actually deter police miscon-
duct. The average officer on the beat could not
possibly retain all this information, even as-
suming the existence of a logical progression
of the rule's development and an opportunity
to consciously reflect prior to making a.
search.41 Professor Wingo has observed:
To the police officer acting under the pres-
sures of the moment the search appeared to be
entirely reasonable, and there was very little
time to ponder the question. The United
States Supreme Court may consider the case
for months before making its decision, and
even then is apt to be divided on its determi-
nation of the issue.
4 2
As the decisions are often inconsistent and
complicated, the task placed upon the prosecu-
tor to educate the officer is likewise impossible.
One critic has stated these decisions "would,
not deter or enlighten a policeman in Gary
with a Ph.D. who is going to law school at
night." 43
With these three factors in mind, Chief jus-
tice Burger stated:
[Hiow can we think that a policeman will be
deterred by a judicial ruling on suppression of
evidence which never affects him personally,
and of Which he learns, if at all, long after he
has forgotten the details of the particular epi-
sode which occasioned suppression? This is an
important issue which proponents of deter-
40 Spiotto, supra note 26, at 276. A better alter-
native would be a continuing education program.
See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as.
Amicus Curiae at 12-13, in California v. Krivda,
409 U.S. 33 (1972) (per curiam).
41 Contra Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682-
(1972).
42 Wingo, supra note 33, at 577.
43 Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mis-
take, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 80, 100 (1969).
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rence-by-suppression must meet; it cannot be
swept under the rug."
It is well recognized that the police are more
apt to be guided by norms within the police
organization than by court decisions.45 In
many situations the violation of the fourth
amendment might be encouraged by police
training, departmental policy, and police supe-
riors who are usually sympathetic where the
search was "administratively reasonable." The
courts themselves often encourage this by jus-
tifying the search where incriminating evi-
dence has been found on a defendant guilty of
a serious crime.46 For example, a court upheld
authorization to search 20 buildings in a city
block because the victim's body was found in
this area.47 Thus, it is questionable whether the
exclusionary rule actually has any direct deter-
rent effect upon the police. In some situations,
such as a highly publicized murder, the rule
might affect police behavior, but generally,
there will be no deterrent effect. 48 Although
the failure of the police to obey the law should
not be determinative,49 this disobedience does
mandate further study of substitutional or sup-
plemental controls.
One should also note that the exclusionary
rule does not apply to the many cases where
no real evidence is found. The deterrent im-
pact then is not as broad as it could be if a
remedy existed that applied to all searches.
II. UTILITARIAN VALUE OF ExcLusIoNARY
RULE
Possibly the most unfortunate result of the
fourth amendment rule is -that it suppresses re-
liable evidence. Contrasted with illegally ob-
44 Burger, supra note 1, at 11.
45 Oaks, supra note 12, at 727-29; J. SKOLNIICK,
supra note 32, at 219-20.
46 See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 28-29 (1967);
J. SKOLNICK, supra note 12, at 220-23; Barrett,
Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth
Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46, 55; Chevigny,
Police Abuses in Connection with the Law of
Search and Seizure, 5 Crm. L. Buu.. 5 (1969).
47 United States v. Schafer, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 83,
32 C.M.R. 83 (1962).
48 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 418
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
49United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S.
218 (1973).
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tained confessions or eyewitness identification
in violation of the right to counsel, the result
of the application of the rule to tangible evi-
dence appears illogical. Confessions obtained
by coercive methods and testimony concerning
an out-of-court identification that was con-
ducted in an unnecessarily suggestive manner
may be conducive to an unreliable in-court
identification, but there is nothing unreliable
about real evidence. 5o Thus, the suppression of
real evidence has a severe impact on trials and
a substantial number of criminal cases are con-
sequently dismissed after motions to suppress
are granted. A recent study in the city of Chi-
cago revealed that approximately 45 per cent
of the gambling offenses, 33 per cent of the
narcotics offenses, and 24 per cent of the cases
of carrying a concealed weapon were dismissed
as the result of this type of motion being
granted, 51 and a 1971 update of these figures
placed the total dismissals at 24 per cent, 36
per cent, and 22 per cent, respectively. 52 Aside
from the court time devoted to such motions,
the most serious result of the rule is the dis-
charge of obviously guilty persons.
A disturbing spin-off of these cases is a loss
of public confidence in our system of justice.-3
50 Cf. Oaks, supra note 12, at 737-38.
51 Id. at 685.
52 Spiotto, supra note 26, at 247. Thirty-four per
cent of the court's time in Narcotics Court in Chi-
cago during 1971 was spent on motions to sup-
press. Id. at 249.
53 The thoughts of many laymen were voiced by
Professor Sidney Hook:
When we read that preventive detention at the
discretion of the judge (by denial of bail to
repeated offenders charged with extremely vi-
olent crimes) it is denounced by some judicial
figures as a "betrayal of elementary justice,"
as "smacking of the concentration camps of
Hitler and Stalin"; when we read that a per-
son jailed for the death of 12 persons is freed
from jail and that the case against him dis-
missed because of prosecution's only evidence
against him was a voluntary confession to the
police who failed to inform him of his rights;
when we read that a man who murdered one
of three hostages he had taken had a record
of 25 arrests ranging from armed robbery to
aggravated assault and battery, and that at the
time of arrest, he was free on bail awaiting
Grand jury action on charges in five separate
cases in a two-month period preceding the
murder; when we read that a man whose
speeding car has been stopped by a motorcycle
policeman who, without a search warrant,
forced him to open his trunk that contained
the corpse of a woman and two children,
walks out of the court scot-free because the
FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN
While the Supreme Court should not make de-
cisions on the basis of perceived public accept-
ance, popular dissatisfaction indicates that the
Court has not finished the job it began in
Weeks. The courts do have the obligation to
maintain confidence in the justice system, and
the obligation here can be met by an experi-
mental approach to what is in essence an ex-
perimental problem. The exclusionary rule also
affects the plea bargaining process5 4 in situa-
tions where the prosecutor's case is weak or
where he has a heavy caseload.5 5 To pressure
the prosecutor to negotiate a plea, defense at-
torneys are often encouraged to employ mo-
tions to suppress as a tactic. False testimony is
likewise encouraged by the application of the
rule; where the police are interested in a con-
viction, they may distort the truth to ensure
the lawfulness of the search and the conviction
of offenders.5 6 Corruption of police officers is
another unwanted by-product of the exclusion-
ary rule. By manipulation of the rule a police
officer may immunize an offender while ap-
pearing to do an aggressive job of law en-
forcement. For example, this happens where an
officer makes a gambling raid without a war-
rant or probable cause. One study found that:
An examination of the records and a period of
observation of this practice in the court is
fairly convincing that the raids are made to
immunize the gamblers while at the same time
satisfying the public that gamblers are being
harassed by police.57
evidence is ruled inadmissible-we can only
conclude with Mr. Bumble that the law's an
ass.
Hook, The Rights of Victims, 38 ENCOUNTER
11-13 (1972). See also E. CAHN, DISSENTS OF
INJUSTIcE 14, 17 (Midland ed. 1964); Paulsen,
The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the
Police, 52 J. CtmX. L.C. & P.S. 225, 256 (1961).
54 Nearly ninety per cent of all criminal cases
are settled by negotiated pleas. Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm.
L. REv. 50 (1968); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 1972, at 394, table D7 (1973).
55 See Oaks, supra note 12, at 748. See gener-
ally Alschuler, supra note 54.
56 See Amicus Curiae Brief for State of Illinois,
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973);
J. SKOLNICK, supra note 43, at 214-15; Burns,
supra note 43, at 100; Chevigny, supra note 46, at
3, 5, 8-11.
57 Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal
Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385, 392 (1951) ; Peterson,
Another cost of the exclusionary rule is that
it imposes a single, inflexible, and drastic
sanction without regard to the nature, circum-
stance, or degree of police misconduct.
Whether an honest mistake or outrageous mis-
conduct, the result is always the same-even if
it means immunity from prosecution for a
plainly guilty defendant. Indeed, in those cases
where a police officer in a good faith effort to
comply with the law secures a warrant that is
later found to be technically insufficient, the
evidence is excluded and the accused goes free.
It is excluded notwithstanding the fact that the
decision to search was made by a judicial
officer and not by a police officer.
In expressing his view that the same sanc-
tion should not be applied to honest mistakes
and intentional misconduct, Chief Justice
Burger stated:
Freeing either a tiger or a mouse in a school-
room is an illegal act, but no rational person
would suggest that these two acts should be
punished in the same way.58
Logic should dictate that society has the right
to a reasoned judicial response based on the
misconduct involved.
5 9
If the exclusionary rule deters improper po-
lice conduct, then every person receives a ben-
efit, albeit indirect. In theory, the police will
respect everyone's fourth amendment rights
and society will thus benefit. But at the present
time the only person who receives a direct
benefit is the person who has been incrimi-
nated by illegally seized evidence; an innocent
person does not receive any benefit unless he
can effectively recover damages as an alterna-
tive to the rule. Presently there are many rea-
sons why suits are not brought for violations
Restriction in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52
Nw. U.L. REv. 45, 57-59 (1957).
58 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 419
(1971) (dissenting opinion).
59 Id. In at least two cases in this area the Su-
preme Court appears to have left room for a
measured approach. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), the Court appears to have left room
for an approach based on the degree of abuse. Id.
at 655. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967), the
"traditional responsibility" of courts under the
fourth amendment was described as that of guard-
ing against "over-bearing" or harassing police con-
duct. Id. at 18.
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of the fourth amendment either under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) or as a constitutional
tort.60 The fear of reprisal,"1 the lack of actual
damages,6 2 and the substantial delay in obtain-
ing damages are factors which tend to discour-
age such remedies.63 In addition, for most po-
tential plaintiffs, the "moral aspects of the
case" are not favorable;6 only the plaintiffs
with "clean hands" and some respectability can
successfully sue a police officer. As for the
moral aspects, the reputation of the individual
plaintiff, including prior convictions, is admis-
sible to lessen damages, impeach the witness,
or to show that the officer was acting in good
faith. 65
It is recognized that most illegal police ac-
tion operates against the lower levels of
society.66 Possibly because these people live in
high crime areas, the police realize that their
lack of respectability will often prevent suc-
cessful suits. These same individuals are unable
to retain attorneys because most attorneys are
reluctant to take this type of suit without a
retainer in advance or a substantial possibility
of success so that the case may be taken on a
contingent fee basis.
67
Even where there is a suit against the indi-
vidual officer, damages are generally not
awarded. Evidently, juries are reluctant to im-
pose damages, especially where contraband has
been found. Many -times only nominal damages
are awarded because there have been no actual
damages suffered. Without any actual damages,
recovery of any punitive damages is difficult, if
not impossible.6 8 In some jurisdictions the
plaintiff must also show malice or ill-will be-
60 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).6 1Wingo, supra note 33, at 579 n.45, and au-
thorities cited therein.6" Id.
63 Spiotto, supra note 26, at 272.
64 Foote, supra note 31, at 499-501.
65 Id. at 504-08.
66 Splotto, supra note 26, at 255-57.
67 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OT POLICE COMMU-
NITY RELATIONS, MATERIALS ON POLICE LITIGA-
VON 3 (1970); Foote, supta note 31, at 500;
Note, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Congres-
sional Assault on Mapp v. Ohio, 61 Gmo. LJ.
1453, 1462-63 (1973).
68 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949)
(Murphy, J., dissenting); Spiotto, supra note 26,
at 272.
fore damages will be allowed.6 9 Even if the
jury decides -to penalize an over-zealous officer,
the plaintiff's recovery will depend on finding
free assets of the officer from which a judg-
ment could be satisfied; this is often difficult.
Where there is no compensation, the individual
is required to bear -the loss, but in terms of
basic fault principles, the one who caused the
injury or damage should bear the loss.
70 So
under the present system, only those caught
with evidence of a crime benefit from this ap-
plication of the fourth amendment.
III. JUDICIAL REACTION
Because the exclusionary rule may not deter
illegal police conduct and because of the, "mon-
strous price" society pays, four Supreme Court
Justices, when analyzing the rule in terms of
its costs versus its benefits, have expressed their
dislike for the exclusionary rule.71
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire7 2 Justice
Harlan, concurring, stated that the Court must
"face up to -the basic constitutional mistakes"
of the Mapp decision. Had the fourth amend-
ment never been held applicable to the state
case, he would have had "little difficulty in vot-
ing to sustain this conviction." 73 "The law of
search and seizure is due for an overhauling," he
stated, and he suggested that such a re-evalua-
tion start by overruling the Mapp decision.7 4
Justice Black in Coolidge stated that the
fourth amendment alone could not be taken as
requiring the exclusion of evidence secured
through an unlawful search or seizure: "That
Amendment did not when adopted, and does
not now, contain any constitutional rule bar-
ring the admission of illegally seized
evidence." 5 If the evidence were to be ex-
69Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949)
(Murphy, J., dissenting).
70 Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities
Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45
So. CAL. L. REv. 131, 138-39 (1972).71 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
490, 492, 493, 510 (1971), Justices Harlan, Black,
Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger. In Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971), Chief
Justice Burger stated the exclusionary rule, or, to
use his term, the "suppression doctrine," should be
modified.
72 403 U.S. 443, 491 (1971).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 490.
75 Id. at 497.
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cluded at all, "it must be under the Fifth
Amendment, not the Fourth." 76 This view,
which he had expressed previously in Mapp,
has not been accepted by other members of the
Court.7 7 Justice Blackmun concurred in Justice
Black's view "that the Fourth Amendment sup-
ports no exclusionary rule."78 Chief Justice
Burger also agreed that the fourth amendment
does not require the exclusion of illegally
seized evidence. 9 He stated that the result
reached in Coolidge was a graphic illustration
of "the monstrous price we pay for the Exclu-
sionary Rule." 80
Also decided the same day as Coolidge was
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Burean of Narcotics.81 In Bivens,
Chief Justice Burger,
8 2 like Justices Black
83
and Blackmun,84 dissented from the holding
that an individual has a federal cause of action
for violation of his fourth amendment rights
because he felt the majority had undertaken a
legislative role.8 5 The Chief Justice stated that
the exclusionary rule was based on the need to
"deter law enforcement authorities from using
improper methods to obtain evidence." 86 Con-
tinuing, he stated, "[t]here is no empirical ev-
idence to support the claim that the rule ac-
tually deters illegal conduct of law enforcement
officials .- " 87
[Slociety has at least as much right to expect
rationally graded responses from judges in
place of the universal "capital punishment" we
inflict on all evidence when police error is
shown in its acquisition.... Instead of continu-
ing to enforce the suppression doctrine inflexi-
bly, rigidly, and mechanically, we should view
it as one of the experimental steps in the
great tradition of common law and acknowl-
edge its shortcomings. But in the same spirit
we should be prepared to discontinue what the
76 Id. at 498.
77 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
412-15 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
7s Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
510 (1971).
,9 Id. at 492.
80 Id. at 493.
81403 U.S. 388 (1971).
82 Id. at 411.
83 Id. at 427.
84 Id. at 430.
8-', Id. at 412.
56 Id. at 413.
s7 Id. at 416.
experience of over a half century has shown
neither deters errant officers nor affords a
remedy to the totally innocent victims of
official misconduct.8 8
But absent some other effective sanction, the
Chief Justice stated that he would hesitate be-
fore abandoning the rule.
8 9
Chief Justice Burger then invited Congress
to "provide some meaningful and effective
remedy against unlawful conduct by govern-
ment officials." The statute could provide for:
(1) A waiver of sovereign immunity;
(2) The creation of a cause of action
against the government;
(3) The creation of a quasi-judicial tribunal
to adjudicate all claims;
(4) A provision that the statutory remedy is
in lieu of the exclusionary rule; and
(5) A plain statement that the exclusionary
rule should not be applied to evidence obtained
in violation of the fourth amendment.
9 0
IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE To BIVENS
In response to the invitation of Chief Justice
Burger, the Congress amended the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in March, 1974, to
provide the victims of certain acts committed
by federal law enforcement officials acting
within the scope of employment, or possibly
under the color of federal law, with a cause of
action against the federal government.
9 1 The
amendment permits suits for claims arising out
of "assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, abuse of process, or malicious
88 Id. at 419-20.
89 Id. at 415, 420.
90 Id. at 422-23.
91 PuB. L. No. 93-253 § 2 (March 16, 1974).
Section 2680(h) of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by striking out the period at
the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof a
colon and the following: "Prozided, That,
with regard to acts or omissions of investiga-
tive or law enforcement officers of the United
States Government, the provisions of this
chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall
apply to any claim arising, on or after the
date of the enactment of this proviso, out of
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false ar-
rest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecu-
tion. For the purpose of this subsection, 'in-
vestigative or law enforcement officer' means
any officer of the United States who is em-
powered by law to execute searches, to seize
evidence, or to make arrests for violations of
Federal law."
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-prosecution." 02 A federal law enforcement of-
ficial is defined as an "officer of the United
States who is empowered by law. to execute
searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests
-for violations of Federal law." 93 Generally, the
'damages under the FTCA are limited to per-
-sonal injury and property damage.9 4
The amendment, unfortunately, will mean
-many different things to many different judges
and to many different administering agencies.
-Narrowly construed, it may provide only a
limited remedy to aggrieved citizens, while
with imagination, it can be a worthwhile ex-
periment in control of the police establishment.
-And arguably, the amendment to the FTCA
contains the provisos set forth in Chief Justice
Burger's model and could be seen as an alter-
-native to the exclusionary rule. The Tort
Claims Act, as originally passed in 1946, does
waive sovereign immunity and does create a
judicial forum for a cause of action against the
.government.95 But the last two suggestions by
the Chief Justice that there must be a state-
*ment that the remedy against the government
is in lieu of the exclusionary rule and a state-
ment that the evidence obtained in violation of
-the exclusionary rule is admissible are regret-
tably not contained in 'the amendment to the
Act.90 Thus, the crucial issue to be examined
when considering the amendment to the Fed-
•eral Tort Claims Act is whether or not it is a
"'meaningful alternative" as contemplated by
the Chief Justice.97 As he stated:
92 Id.
93 Id. The Judge Advocate General of the Army
"has opined that military police and criminal inves-
tigators are included within the term "investigative
-or law enforcement officers." He is also of the
-opinion that a unit commander, post exchange se-
'curity guard, soldier on riot duty, disciplinary gate
.guard, or, in general, commissioned officers are not
:included. DAJA-AL 1974/4278, May 30, 1974. Al-
though not discussed in this article, another doc-
'trine that comes into play in determining whether
*a claim may be processed against military police
-or criminal investigators is the "incident to serv-
ice" bar under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 139 (1950). The
"meaning of "abuse of process," and the effect of
-state law are additional doctrines to be considered
:in making such a determination.
9428 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
95 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674 et seq. (1970).
91 PuB. L. No. 93-253 § 2 (March 16, 1974).97 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
420 (1971).
Reasonable and effective substitutes can be
formulated if Congress would take the lead, as
it did for example in 1946 in the Federal Tort
Claims Act. I see no insuperable obstacle to
the elimination of the suppression doctrine if
Congress would provide some meaningful and
effective remedy against unlawful conduct by
government officials.98
In order to come to a reasoned conclusion as
to whether or not the amendment is a "simple
structure" 9 providing a meaningful substitute
for the rule, the amendment itself and the
entire act must be examined in detail.
The Claims Procedure Under the Federal
Tort Claims Act
The act is an efficient vehicle for processing
claims and is procedurally so simple as to en-
courage aggrieved parties to file claims. ]Before
a suit may be brought in a federal district
court under the Act, a claim must be filed
against the federal agency whose agent alleg-
edly violated the plaintiff's fourth amendment
rights ;100 only after this claim has been-denied,
or six months has elapsed since the claim was
filed, may a civil suit be instituted.' 01 The
claim must be submitted in writing, and must
state the damages as a sum certain;1012 this is a
jurisdictional requirement and cannot be
waived.'0 3 The amount claimed is significant,
for if the claim is administratively denied, a
complaint filed in a district court is limited to
the amount claimed originally, absent a show-
ing of newly discovered evidence not reason-
ably discoverable at the time of the administra-
tive claim or a showing of intervening facts
relating to the amount claimed.'04
Once a claim has been filed the federal
agency may settle any claim up to $25,000,105
and any claim in excess of that amount may be
settled only with the prior written approval of
the Attorney General or his designee. 08 Settle-
ment authority under the Act includes not only
the authority to pay the claim submitted, but
9s Ad. at 421.
09 Id. at 422.
100 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1970).
101 Id.
102 28 C.F.R. § 14.2a (1974).
103 Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d. 1047
(3d Cir. 1971).
10428 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1970).




also to compromise the claim.10 7 It should be
noted that the vast majority of claims under
the act presumably will be administratively
handled, obviating the need to go to court.' 08
Once the claim has been denied, trial in fed-
eral district court is before a judge alone, 10 9
thus avoiding a jury potentially biased in favor
of a police officer.
A tuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act
cannot be successful unless it falls within the
conditions of the statute waiving sovereign im-
munity. The amendment to the Act specifically
depends upon the "provision of this chapter [§§
2671-2680] and section 1346(b) of title 28.110
Section 1346(b) provides that the cause of ac-
tion must meet the following requirements be-
fore sovereign immunity will be waved:
(1) Claim for money damages;
(2) Claim for damage or loss of property
or death or personal injury;
(3) The damage must have been the result
of a negligent or wrongful act;
(4) Such act must have been committed by
a federal employee;
(5) The employee must have been acting
within the scope of employment; and
(6) The circumstances must be such that a
private person would be liable under state law
if such a person committed the act."'
Money Damages and Injury to Person or
Property
These requirements may severely limit the
scope of the amendment's usefulness. The claim
107 Id.
108 Hearings on. H.R. 10439 Before the House
Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1974).
109 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1970). Suits against the
United States pursuant to the FTCA can only be
brought in a federal district court. 28 U.S.C. §
1346(e) (1970).
110 PuB. L. No. 93-253 § 2 (March 16, 1974).
111 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970) :
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of
this title, the district courts, together with the
United States District Court for the District
of the Canal Zone and the District Court of
the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive juris-
diction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages, accruing
on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the
must be for "money damages ... for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or
death"'112 and, this provision being met, the
federal government becomes liable for actual
and compensatory damages. While it would
seem that the definition of property and per-
sonal damage would be a federal question, it is,
by the terms of the statute, left to state law. 1 s
In most tort situations, there will be little dif-
ficulty in interpreting this section. For exam-
ple, where a government driver operating a
government vehicle negligently collides with
another vehicle there is usually property dam-
age and in some cases personal injury. How-
ever, in uncommon tort situations involving an
illegal search or seizure, occasioned by either a
failure to comply with the no-knock statute or
the lack of probable cause, there may not be
any property damage, let alone personal injury.
In fact, personal or property damage may be
the exception rather than the rule in fourth
amendment situations. The harms often inci-
dent to an unlawful search or seizure include
invasion of privacy (often a dwelling home), a
permanent loss of the feeling of security at
home and in other private enclaves, humilia-
tion, damage to reputation and dignity, mental
and emotional distress, and ultimately being
subjected to the search or seizure.
Compared to the other types of harms, men-
tal or emotional distress is the most assessable,
generally recoverable as a parasitic damage
where it results from a trespass to land 14 or
from assault, battery, or false imprisonment.115
These types of damages will usually accompany
a violation of the fourth amendment, and thus
at least this one type of damage should be re-
coverable.
It should be noted that the FTCA has never
prohibited suit for the intentional infliction of
mental distress, invasion of privacy, or negli-
gence. However, the act prohibits the award of
United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred.
112 Id.
"'s 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2672
(1970.). See Hendry v. United States, 418 F2d
774, 780 (2d Cir. 1969).
114 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 44 (3d ed. 1964).
115 Id. at 67-68.
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what are usually a major part of the damages
in those cases: punitive damages. It seems that
the intent of the amendment to the act-to allow
damages for the intentional torts of policemen-
impacts on these already allowed causes of ac-
tion, possibly allowing suit where it would not
have- been allowed before. Where mental or
emotional distress are inflicted without an ac-
companying compensable tort, the government
may or may not be liable under the many state
laws. Where a law officer, by abusing his posi-
tion or the legal process, intentionally or reck-
lessly, inflicts a mental or emotional harm and
his conduct is extreme or outrageous, liability
will be found in most jurisdictions.1 310 Where
the conduct is not extreme or outrageous, there
is usually no recovery without resulting bodily
harm.1 27 There are still a few states that require
some type of impact and still others that con-
sider resulting bodily harm a prerequisite to
collecting in any case for emotional damage.""'
One -should also note that the law varies from
state to state as to bystanders. 10 Where the
offending act is merely negligent, bodily harm
is generally required for recovery, 1 20 but there
are a few jurisdictions that will award damages
when only mental or emotional harm occurs.
121
The other harms mentioned above are less
concrete than emotional distress, and, hence,
recovery for damage solely to those interests
would be even more difficult, if not impossible,
even if they accompanied another intentional
tort. What little legislative history there is of
the act demonstrates that the Congress in-
tended to protect those interests uniquely
harmed by unlawful searches and seizures. The
Senate Report indicates that pain, suffering,
and humiliation are intended to be compen-
sable,12 as is an invasion of privacy. 128 It also
116 W. PROSSER, HANDBOH OF THE LAW OF
ToRTs 60 (4th ed. 1971) ; RESTATEMENT oF ToRTs
2d § 46 (1965).
117 W. PnossER, supra note 116, at 60-61 ; RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 116, at § 46, comment d.
118 See, e.g., Duty v. General Finance Co., 154
Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
1L9 W. PaOSSEa, supra note 116, at 61.
120 Id. at 328-29.
121 E.g., Pillou v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 28, 441 P.2d
912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
122 119 CONG. REc. 21569 (daily ed. Nov. 30,
1973).
2
23 1d. There was never an exception to the
FTCA on suing for invasion of privacy.
states that the purpose of the bill is to make
the government liable for "the same type of
conduct alleged to have occurred in
Bivens." 124 In Bivens the conduct resulted
only in a cause of action for humiliation, em-
barrassment, and mental suffering.
125
The legislative history also indicates that the
government would be liable for "constitutional
torts." 28 The Court in Bivens recognized that
the "interests protected by state laws regulat-
ing trespass and the invasion of privacy, and
those protected by the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures, may be inconsistent or even
hostile." 127 With respect to damages this is es-
pecially true; the interests to be protected by
the amendment 'include not only property
rights but all the intangibles contained within
the rubric of privacy. The amendment thus
protects society and its members from more
than just ordinary tortious acts.
There are two ways that courts can effec-
tuate this apparent congressional intent. First,
they can 'find that while the law of the state is
the general rule, where there is conflict with
the intent of the Act itself, federal law
controls.128 Unfortunately, the conflict is be-
tween a nonsubstantial legislative history and
some very specific statutory language. Nonethe-
less, the unique nature of the right of privacy
and the fact that the amendment is later in
time than the original statutory limitation aug-
ment the history and make this the probable
interpretation. Second, in states where recov-
ery for mental distress is limited, courts can
consider all offensive encounters between po-
lice and citizens as per se extreme and outra-
geous, and intentional rather than negligent.
This telescoping of federal policy through state
law does not, however, take care of all of the
124 Id.
125 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389-90
(1971).
126 119 CONG. REc. 21569 (daily ed. Nov. 30,
1973).
127 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394
(1971).
:
128 See Young v. United States, 184 F2d 587
(D.C. Cir. 1950); State of Maryland, Use of
Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F2d 869 (4th




less concrete interests protected by the amend-
ment. In both situations, substantial damages
could be awarded because the amendment to
the act and the fourth amendment, which it
implements, are intended to protect these
unique constitutional interests. The remedy in
this light would not, in essence, be a punitive
remedy, which the act specifically prohibits.
12 9
The provisions of the act that require use of
the law of the state can be read consistently
with the congressional intent to compensate for
other than physical and property damage: Con-
gress could have intended to compensate for
these interests only when the state allows such
compensation. However, the Congress' major
concern was evidently with only the unique
damages that occur during an unlawful search
and seizure, indicating an intent to compensate
in all such cases.
Negligent or Wrongful Act
The amendment to the FTCA specifically
depends on sections 1346 and 2671 to 2180 which
provide that the government will be liable for
the negligent or wrongful acts of its employees
within -the scope of their employment. Prior to
March 1974, an exception to liability were the
torts enumerated in the amendment: "assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse
of process, or malicious prosecution." 130 The
amendment significantly changed the statute by
permitting suits for these torts committed by
"investigative or law enforcement officers."
False imprisonment is an intentional tort
where the defendant intentionally causes the
confinement or restrains the freedom of move-
ment of the claimant or another person.' 3'
False arrest, like false imprisonment, is a lin-
ear descendant of common law trespass; the
latter differs from the former in that false ar-
rest is the restraint imposed by the assertion of
legal authority. 132 Both of these torts are in-
tentional in nature. However, most actions for
false arrest against police officers are not the
result of intentional misconduct by the police
but rather some form of careless or negligent
action. In many cases the officer is acting in
good faith, such as where an after-the-fact re-
19 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
13028 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970).
1-3 W. PROSSm, supra note 116, at 42.
'132 Id.
view reveals that the officer did not comply
with the probable cause test, the reliability test,
or the basis of knowledge test.13 3 Under a tres-
pass theory, the voluntary confinement of the
individual, even though it was in good faith, is
a trespass. 34 The government is thus liable for
such a trespass although there was no specific
intent to unlawfully detain the claimant. The
act is intentional in the sense that it was vol-
untary-the essence of the offense.135 It was
the clear intent of Congress to impose liability
for false imprisonment and false arrest, and
even in situations where only an innocent vio-
lation of the fourth amendment has taken place,
such an arrest in violation of the fourth amend-
ment would be actionable. False imprisonment
is looked upon more broadly than fourth amend-
ment violations. For example, where an officer
innocently, although reasonably, arrests an indi-
vidual because of a mistaken identification, he
will be liable for false imprisonment. 36 How-
ever, assuming probable cause, such an arrest
has been held not to violate the fourth amend-
ment.1
3 7
"Abuse of process" is technically a tort
where the legal process has been set in motion
for an ulterior motive.' 39  For example, an
officer may, on the basis of probable cause, ar-
rest an individual only to compel him to sur-
render certain property to the officer. In an-
other situation, the police officer may obtain a
properly executed search warrant and obtain
incriminating evidence, again with an ulterior
motive in mind. The act of the officer in nei-
ther example violated the fourth amendment,
but nevertheless, there was an abuse of proc-
ess.
The legislative history indicates that the
amendment does not refer to whatever the
local state law defines as the tort "abuse of
process." The bill was introduced because of a
number of incidents in which federal agents
conducted "abusive, illegal and unconstitutional
'no knock raids.'" 139 The most notorious of
133 Gilligan, Probable Cause and the Infornier,
60 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1973).
134 W. PROSSER, supra note 116, at 48.
' 5 Id. at 45-46.
136 Id.
1 37 Cf. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
'138 W. PROSSER, supra note 116, at 856-58.
339 119 CONG. REC. 21569 (daily ed. Nov. 30,
1973).
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these were the raids conducted in Collinsville,
Illinois, where federal agents, acting without
warrants, kicked in the doors of homes without
any warning, shouting obscenities. 140 Another
example of the conduct intended to come
within the purview of the amendment is the
fact pattern in Bivens.141 Federal agents with-
out any claim of federal authority, entered
Bivens' home, manacled him in front of his
family, threatened to arrest the entire family,
and searched the house from stem to stern. At
the police station he was subjected to a visual
strip search.
The Congressional Record indicates that the
amendment waives sovereign immunity where
"law enforcement abuses involved constitu-
tional torts." 142 The federal government will
be subject to:
liability whenever its agents act under color of
law so as to injure the public through search
and seizures that are conducted without war-
rants or with warrants issued without prob-
able cause.
143
The amendment itself clarifies the meaning
of the term "abuse of process" to a certain ex-
tent. "Law enforcement official" is defined as
an "officer of the United States who is empow-
ered by law to execute searches, to seize evi-
dence, or to make arrests for violations of
Federal law." 144 Surely, if the act did not
apply to illegal searches and seizures but only
to false arrests and false imprisonment, that
expansive definition would be mere surplusage.
A federal tort of "abuse of process" could also
conceivably be used to allow recovery in those
situations where state law does not allow re-
covery for mental distress and harm to pri-
vacy, reputation, and dignity, although such an
extension would require a broad reading of the
amended act.
Even if the language "abuse of process" is
defined in a conventional tort sense, there will
still be governmental liability where the fourth
amendment violation amounts to a trespass.145
'4 oId.
141 Id.
142 Id. See also 120 CoNG. RFc. 1400 (daily ed.
Mar. 5, 1974) Where there is illegal entry, the
aggrieved person has a cause of action.
143 Id.
'44 PuB. L. No. 93-253 § 2 (Mar. 16, 1974).
'45 Cf. United States v. Artieri, 491 F.2d 440,
446 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974).
As with false arrest and false imprisonment,
liability could be imposed even though there is
a good faith violation of the fourth amend-
ment. Where there has been an intrusion, a
common law trespass may be maintained with-
out proof of actual damage.' 46 However, if ac-
tual damages are not shown, the defendant can
only recover nominal damages.
Discretionary-Governmental Act Exception
Specific statutory exceptions to liability are
set forth in section 2680. Section 2680a 4 7 first
provides that the government will not be liable
for an "act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execu-
tion of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid." '48 This
clause is intended to prohibit suits to test the
constitutionality of a statute. Unlawful arrests
because of the unconstitutionality of a statute
are not uncommon; they frequently concern
disorderly conduct statutes. The upshot of
these arrests is that any evidence obtained is
inadmissible; this result may be either because
of the unconstitutionality of the statute or be-
cause of the illegality of the arrest from a
fourth amendment viewpoint. Where the stat-
ute is held to be unconstitutionally vague, for
example, and there would have been a valid ar-
rest but for the failure of the statute, the ex-
140 W. PROSSER, supra note 116 at 29.
147 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970).
Any claim based upon an act or omission of
an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or reg-
ulation, whether or not such statute or regula-
tion be valid, or based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or per-
form a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion in-
volved be abused.
To determine the Congressional intent as to sec-
tion 2680, examine Hearings on H.R. 5373 and
H.R. 6463. Before the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). As to the dis-
cretionary act exception see id. at 28, 33, 35, 45.
See also H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
10 (1942). H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 are virtually
the same as the Federal Tort Claims Act, S. 2221
as amended. SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 30-31 (1946).
4s Hearings on HR. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Be-
fore the House Conmt. on the Judiciary, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 33, 35 (1942). The exception
under discussion was the same as the version
eventually passed. See also Powell v. United
States, 233 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1956).
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ception applies and the government will not be
liable. In some contexts the arrest will be un-
lawful for an additional reason: the officer did
not have probable cause for the arrest. In the
latter case, the amendment to the Act would
allow a suit for this police conduct. Further-
more, there may be an arrest pursuant to an
unconstitutional statute and the evidence seized
held "inadmissible" because there is an overly
broad search or because of the lack of any jus-
tification for a search. Two hypotheticals dem-
onstrate this. First, A is arrested pursuant to a
motor vehicle statute proclaimed to be uncon-
stitutional and as a product of his arrest,
certain illegal drugs have been obtained. Thus,
even if the statute was valid, the seizure of ev-
idence incident to the arrest was unlawful'
49
and consequenly, a suit under the amendment
would be permissible. In the second hypotheti-
cal, again assume an arrest pursuant to an un-
constitutional statute, and incident to the ar-
rest, the search impermissibly goes beyond the
"immediate area" as defined in Chimel v.
California.50 As with the previous example, a
suit would be permissible under the Act.
The second clause of section 2680a states
that there will be no liability when a federal
agency or employee of the government per-
forms a discretionary function whether or not
negligence was present or whether or not there
has been a wrongful act. This exception ap-
plies even if there has been an abuse of discre-
tion. While the terms "federal agency" 151 and
"employee of the Government" 152 are defined
elsewhere in the Act the term "discretionary
function or duty" is not. One can conclude
that the primary purpose of this exception is
evidently to prevent the disruption of the sepa-
ration and balance of power between the judi-
cial and legislative branches 1-3 The problem
that arises in the fourth amendment context is
that most actions of police officers are in many
149 Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
150 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
15128 U.S.C. § 2671 (1970).
152 Id.
153 Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th
Cir. 1950). The term has a long history. See, e.g.,
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). The
concept of discretionary function has been devel-
oped in non-Tort Claims Act cases. See Jayson,
Application of the Discretionary Function Excep-
tion, 24 FED. B.J. 153, 155-57 (1964).
ways discretionary; policy decisions are often
made by the cop on the beat.
In Dalehite v. United States,154 the first case
decided by the Supreme Court to deal with the
FTCA discretionary function exception, the
Court stated:
It is unnecessary to define . . . precisely where
discretion ends. It is enough to hold . . . that
the "discretionary function or duty" that can-
not form a basis of a suit under the Federal
Tort Claims Act includes more than the initi-
ation of programs and activities. It also in-
cludes determinations made by executives or
administrators in establishing plans, specifica-
tions or schedule of operations. Where there
is room for policy or judgment and decision
there is discretion. It necessarily follows that
acts of subordinates in carrying out the opera-
tion ... in accordance with official directions
cannot be actionable.155
The language in Dalehite has resulted in a
planning-operational level dichotomy to deter-
mine the application of the discretionary func-
tion exception. At least in theory, this is a rel-
atively simple test to apply. A court might
only have to examine the organizational table
of the particular agency to reach its decision.
But in practice, such distinctions are difficult,
if not impossible, to make. At the top hierar-
chal level of government, decisions are made
as to both day-to-day operations and those
dealing with policy, and many policy decisions
are delegated by top level administrators to the
bottom of the police structure. It is the nature
of the decision and not the official that should
determine the exception's applicability.
Professor Jaffe suggests a more realistic ap-
proach. He looks to several factors: the exist-
ence of alternative remedies, the capacity of a
court to evaluate the propriety of the officer's
action, and the effect of liability on the budget
or effective administration1 56 Where there ex-
154 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
L55 Id. at 36-37.
156 Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L. Rnv. 209,
219 (1963). See generally Clark, Discretionary
Function and Official Immunity: Judicial Forays
into Sanctuaries from Tort Liability, 16 Aia
FORCE L. REv. 33 (1974) ; Peck, Laird v. Nelns:
A Call for Review and Revision of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 48 WASH. L. Rnv. 391 (1973) ;
Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposed
Construction of the Discretionary Function Excep-
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ists an alternative remedy, the court may be
more disposed to hold the Act is discretionary.
However, in the fourth amendment area, the
only other alternative remedies are exclusion
of evidence, an unsatisfactory and not always
available remedy, and a suit against a probably
judgment-proof police officer.
Jaffe's second factor, the capacity of the
court, stems from the principle of separation of
powers. The federal courts have been deter-
mining what constitutes a violation of the
fourth amendment since 1914, and this screen-
ing by the courts has not been considered
undue harassment of law enforcement officials,
nor does it evidently severely impede law en-
forcement. This is true whether the court is
reviewing the question of lawful arrest, a con-
certed action against a dangerous criminal, or
a plan for a mass arrest. The courts have also
examined the constitutionality of police depart-
ment regulations' 5 7 and standard operating
procedures158 without unduly hampering the
executive branch of government. The decisions
made by law enforcement officials cannot be
equated with the trial and error process that is
used to guide the nation with its international,
defense, and major domestic concerns. Limit-
ing the freedom to experiment will not sub-
stantially prejudice the community interest in
aggressive law enforcement, nor will civil lia-
bility result in "wasting" law enforcementi
officials' time in court. In fact, this remedy, be-
cause of its administrative claim procedure,
may ultimately reduce the police officer's court-
room time.
The imposition of damages on the govern-
ment would not impede the executive branch of
government to any great extent. It was this
liability that Congress thought should be im-
posed on the government rather than having
the loss be borne by the police officer or the
individual whose rights have been violated.
The evidence from jurisdictions in which sov-
ereign immunity has been abolished shows
tion, 31 WASH. L. REv. 207 (1956); Reynolds,
The Discretionary Function Exception of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, 57 Gao. L.J. 81 (1968).
157 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973).
258See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973).
the fears of overburdening the budget to be
unwarranted. 159
With respect to police officers, there is an
additional reason for not considering their acts
as discretionary: the benefit in the fourth
amendment area from the protection of per-
sonal liberty outweighs whatever impact there
may be on effective law enforcement.160 Fur-
thermore, the impact would be minimal; the
courts in reviewing alleged fourth amendment
violations under the exclusionary rule have not
interfered with the function of the executive
branch of government."6 As a general rule,
everyday police activities are not considered
discretionary acts.
1 -6 2
Scope of Employment 63
In order for the government to be liable, the
officer's conduct must occur within -the "scope
of his employment." The law of the place of
the tort is the governing law used in this de-
termination.'04 Generally, there are four factors
considered in making a scope-of-employment
determination: 1) the control exercised by the
employee's supervisors;1615 2) the degree to
which the United States Government's pur-
'59 The evidence tends to show "that such liabil-
ity was unlikely to be fiscally excessive or admin-
istratively destructive." Van Alstyne, Government
Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL.
L.F. 919, 969-78 (1966).
160 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1346
(2d Cir. 1972).
161 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
162 Id. See also Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83
(D.C. Cir., Sept. 18, 1974) ; Galella v. Onassis, 487,
F.2d 986, 993 (2d. Cir. 1973); Carter v. Carlson,
447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1014 (1972) ; Sherbutte v. Marine City, 374
Mich. 48, 130 N.W.2d 920 (1964); W. PRossm &
Y. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 156
(3d ed. 1962). But see Norton v. McShane, 332
F.2d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 981 (1965); Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714
(9th Cir. 1961).
-163 The legislative history is silent as to the
meaning of the term. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort
Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo.
LJ. 1 (1946).
164Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857
(1955). See also Hearings on S. 2690 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 41, 42 (1940); Hearings on
H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463. Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1942).




poses are being served at the time of the
incident ;166 3) the work commonly done by
the employee;1617 and 4) the foreseeability of the
employee's conduct.' 68 In general, the govern-
ment would be held liable for any intentional
tort committed by a law enforcement officer
where its purpose, however misguided or ille-
gal, is wholly or in part to further the govern-
ment's business.
69
Interesting problems result in the scope-of-
employment area when police officers, purport-
ing to be in an official capacity, and possibly
wearing uniforms, commit a wrong when the
officers are not actually furthering the govern-
ment's business at all. The Senate Report
states twice that the government is to be liable
when the law enforcement agent acts either
within the scope of his employment or under
color of Federal law.'70 These two phrases
provide opportunities for an expansive reading
of "scope of employment."
State courts might look to leading federal
cases when interpreting the uniquely federal
phrase "under color of Federal law." Officers
act under color of law when "power [is] pos-
sessed by virtue of . . .law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of . . . law." 171 While the mere
wearing of a uniform might not be enough, an
act of the type only or usually performed by a
policeman coupled with a uniform would ap-
pear to be sufficient.'7 2 It could also be argued
that, as the uniform itself creates respect and
possibly fear, all actions in uniform except for
those uniquely personal are clothed with the
authority of the state.'
73
The phrase in the Report-under color of
federal law-may or may not be broader than
the many different state laws on the scope of
employment. Where an employee intentionally
acts out of solely personal motives, often evi-
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 W. PROSSER, supra note 116, at 463.
169 W. PRossER, supra note 116, at 464. See
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961).
170 119 CONG. REc. 21569 (daily ed. Nov. 30,
1973).
1' United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941), interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
172 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72
(1961).
'73 But see Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp.
933, 937 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
denced by the outrageousness of his conduct,
many states will not find the employer liable.'
7 4
However, progressive jurisdictions do allow
recovery where the employer has provided a
peculiar opportunity for loss of temper 7 5 or
where the employer entrusts the employee with
an instrument that is highly dangerous in itself
or is capable of misuse in a highly dangerous
fashion.176 In a few jurisdictions, liability may
extend to all acts of employees, if not
unexpected. 7 7  A federal law enforcement
officer is entrusted with powerful symbols of
authority-a badge and a weapon. In addition,
he is given the status of being a police officer
and is then immersed in a brutalizing culture
of violence and depravity. Thus, it seems that
one of the built-in costs of the business of law
enforcement is the occasional intentional vio-
lent act committed by police officers for per-
sonal motives.
Other Problems with Law of the Place
Under the amendment the imposition of lia-
bility may vary from state to state. Although
liability under the FTCA is determined by the
law of the place of the tort, federal law applies
when it imposes a stricter duty on the federal
law enforcement official.
78
In some cases federal law might apply even
if it were less strict. For example, in one state
there may be a statute forbidding all wiretap-
ping. The question then arises as to what hap-
pens if there is a wiretap pursuant to a valid
federal court-ordered wiretap warrant. Would
the officer be liable for civil damages as a re-
sult of the violation of the state statute and the
interaction of the amended FTCA? Another
possibility is the variance in state law as to
what constitutes a lawful no-knock entry. If
the state law is inconsistent with constitutional
requirements and is, in effect, more stringent,
would the federal officer be liable for civil
74 W. PROSSER, supra note 116, at 464-66;
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY 2d § 245 comment f
(1958); see also JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS § 216.04 (1974).
175 W. PROSSER, supra note 116, at 466.
176 Id.
'77 E.g., Russel v. United States, 465 F.2d 1261
(6th Cir. 1972). The case is interesting in that the
court of appeals and the district court disagreed
over the rule in Kentucky.
178 E.g., Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072
(5th Cir. 1970).
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damages or for a tort under state law? The
deterrence of police misconduct also poses ad-
ditional problems in this setting. If the federal
officers are subject to fifty-one separate rules,
how can the variation of rules deter misconduct
by federal law enforcement officials? While the
Congress could consent to suit where federal
law enforcement officials are not in compliance
with the more stringent state laws, it seems
that it did not intend -to do so in the amend-
ment; all it apparently wished to do was pro-
vide a damage remedy. The broader reading
would impose on the federal establishment fifty-
one separate criminal procedure codes, a conse-
quence of such magnitude that some strong in-
dication of purpose should be needed to con-
strue the Act that way.
Detention of Goods
Section 2680(c) provides for the exclusion
of any claim
arising in respect of the assessment or collec-
tion of any tax or customs duty or the deten-
tion of any goods or merchandise by any
officer of customs or exercise of any other
law-enforcement officer.' 79
It should be noted that this exception was
not intended to preclude suits against the fed-
eral government for items illegally seized.
When the plaintiff seeks recovery of duties
and taxes wrongfully assessed, recovery under
the FTCA is forbidden because an adequate
remedy for such recovery is currently
available 80 and was available at the time the
FTCA was enacted.' 8' For a number of years
the courts had permitted suits for erroneously
assessed taxes 82 and duties. 183 Implicit in sec-
tion 2680(c) is the concept that where goods
are detained to satisfy such an assessment
there could be no suit against the government
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. But the
179 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1970).
18026 U.S.C. § 7441 et seq. (1970 and Supp.
1972); 28 U.S.C. § 211 et seq. (1970 and Supp.
1972).
18126 U.S.C. § 1100 et seq. (1940 and Supp.
1946); 28 U.S.C. §§ 296-7 (1940 and Supp. 1946).
18 2Manseau v. United States, 52 F. Supp. 395
(E.D. Mich. 1943); Exchange National Bank of
Shreveport v. United States, 46 F.2d 566 (W.D.
La. 1931).
' 83 Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243
(1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222
(1901).
legislative history is not helpful in determining
when suits are precluded where there has been
a seizure under a forfeiture statute; only the
suits arising from the "detention of goods by
customs officers" are specifically precluded by
the statute.'8 4 The Act was seemingly not in-
tended to except from the recovery those suits
arising from illegal seizures by law enforce-
ment officials, yet, it has unfortunately been in-
terpreted as excepting suits resulting from the
illegal detention of goods by customs officials
or the agents of the FBI.8 5 To continue to in-
terpret the statute in this manner would clearly
be contrary to the basic purpose of the recent
legislation.
Punitive Damages and Attorney Fees
The Act prohibits the award of punitive
damages,8 and it does not provide for attor-
neys' fees. Indeed, it limits allowable attorneys'
fees for those rich enough to afford to pay
them to twenty per cent of the award, compro-
mise, or settlement, and twenty-five per cent of
any judgment.187  Some attorneys believe,
rightly or wrongly, that the low fee schedule,
at least low in comparison to outside-the-Act
tort claim representation, is designed to dis-
courage lawyers from representing people hav-
ing claims under the Act.188 The failure to
provide for attorneys' fees may make any rem-
edy under the Act, like individual police liabil-
ity, more illusory than real. However, this con-
184 H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1942); Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 33 (1942). Cf. id. at 44-45.
186 United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe de
Ville, 125 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Mo. 1954). See also
United States v. Artieri, 491 F.2d 440, 446 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1974) (dictum); State Marine Lines, Inc. v.
Shultz, 359 F. Supp. 512 (D.S.C. 1973) (Section
2680(c) precluded claim against the government
when agents of the Bureau of Customs searched
plaintiff's vessel and seized certain goods from the
vessel while it was docked in navigable waters);
Jones v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 139 F.
Supp. 38, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1957) ("If plain-
tiff intends to charge a detention of property by
the agents in the exercise of their duties, the
claims are excepted" by section 2680 (c)).
186 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
187 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1970).
188 Hearings on H.R. 10439 Before the Subcomm.
on Claims and Governmental Relations of the




clusion is questionable, at least with respect to
the very poor, for several reasons. Under much
of the claims procedure there is little need for
an attorney. In situations where one is re-
quired, the legal services or Office of Economic
Opportunity lawyers may be available to insti-
tute action against the federal government. But
for persons who are somewhat more affluent
and do not qualify for legal aid, it may be dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to procure an attorney,
and as a consequence, any legal remedies avail-
able to them might be lost.
The failure of the amendment to provide for
punitive damages indicates that it was not in-
tended to act as a deterrent and dictates that it
in fact will not act as a deterrent. An
interesting comparison can be made with the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, which provides the following sanctions for
illegal wiretapping: "(a) actual damages but not
less than liquidated damages computed at the
rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or
$1,000, whichever is higher; (b) punitive dam-
ages; and (c) a reasonable attorney's fee and
other litigation costs reasonably incurred." 189
It seems illogical to provide punitive damages
for illegal wiretapping while not allowing them
for an unlawful search or seizure, which can
be a much more brutalizing experience.
The Non-Exchuiveness of the Remedy
It should also be noted that the remedy pro-
vided by the amended statute is not an exclu-
sive one, and the law enforcement officer can
still be sued in his private capacity. This is in
contrast to other situations in which govern-
ment employees have committed a wrong. For
example, drivers of government automobiles9 0
and doctors working for the Veteran's Admin-
istration 91 cannot be sued as individuals.
V. THE AMENDMENT AS A SUSTITUTE FOR
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Whether the exclusionary rule should be
limited because of this amendment depends on
the familiar assumptions upon which the rule
is based. If the rule is to continue to function,
one must assume that the exclusionary rule de-
189 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970).
:9028 U.S.C. § 2679 (1970).
191 38 U.S.C. § 4116 (1970).
ters illegal misconduct and that there is no
reasonable alternative to the rule.
Although no hearings were held on the bill,
its passage at least arguably demonstrates that
the Congress found that the exclusionary rule
does not effectively deter police misconduct. The
bill does not, however, state that it is to be ap-
plied in lieu of the exclusionary rule; nor does
it state that evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment is admissible in evidence.
This could be an oversight as was the use of
the term "abuse of process" and the failure to
consider the detention exception, but it seems
likely that it was not. The bill was, in all
probability, a response to the Chief Justice's
invitation, which expressly set forth those con-
ditions. The Committee proposing the amend-
ment stated:
[T]his provision should be viewed as a coun-
terpart to the Bivens case and its progeny, in
that it waives the defense of sovereign immu-
nity so as to make the government independ-
ently liable in damages for the same type of
conduct that is alleged to have occurred in
Bivens.1
92
The failure to include the conditions set forth
by Chief Justice Burger evidences the Con-
gressional intent to retain the present exclu-
sionary rule. As Congressman Wiggins stated,
"[T]he remedy is created without the benefits
of that exploration [of the exclusionary rule]
and without modifying this exclusionary
rule." 193 It could be argued that if the first
three suggestions set forth by the Chief Justice
are met and provide a reasonable alternative,
the last two suggestions are superfluous. This
argument hinges on the assumption that the al-
ternative to the exclusionary rule must provide
an adequate remedy.
[NIumerous proposals have been studied for
providing an adequate court remedy for vic-
tims of illegal searches. The key word is ade-
quate since an illusory remedy might serve to
eliminate any means of redress, given the pos-
sibility that courts might see such an apparent
remedy as a basis for modifying or eliminat-
ing the exclusionary rule.'94
192 119 CONG. REc. 21569 (daily ed. Nov. 30,
1973).
'93 120 CONG. REc. 1400 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1974).
194 Id.
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As enacted, however, the amendment does not
provide a reasonable alternative; what is
needed in its place is an alternative that satis-
fies the interests involved.
As far as the interests of the community and
the' individual are concerned, a meaningful al-
ternative must protect the right of privacy and
compensate the individual regardless of
whether incriminating evidence has been
found. Additionally, any alternative devised
must- also deter future misconduct on the part
of pdlice officers while at the same time not
eliminating aggressive law enforcement and
conviction of the guilty. While not inhibiting
pubiic service in the various law enforcement
agencies, the alternative must maintain police
morale while at the same time encouraging im-
provement in recruiting, selection, and train-
ing. Lastly, the alternative should not breed
contempt for the courts.
A determination as to the reasonableness of
the alternative requires analyzing the various
community interests. This analysis assumes
that liability may be imposed under the amend-
ment:for violations of the fourth amendment.
Prior to the amendment to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, an individual whose rights had
been violated was required to pursue his rem-
edy against the police officer under state sub-
stantive law, section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 'l or the federal common law cause of
action,190 although individuals in a few states
might sue the state or a political subdivision of
the state when sovereign immunity had been
waived.19 7 It is doubtful, however, that individ-
'95 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person Within the jurisdiction thereof to
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress.
19 6 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
197 ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070 (1962); CAL.
Gov'T. CODE §§ 815.2, 818 (1966); HAwAI REv.
LAWS § 245A-2 (Supp. 1965); IDAHo CODE ANN.
§ 41-3505 (1961); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 25A1-A20
(1967); MiNN. STAT. § 466.01-.15 (1963); Nrv.
Ray. STAT. § 41.031 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 412.3 (1968) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291,-300.1
(1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 404307 (1968); WASH.
ual liability of the! officer does promote the in-
terests of the community; individual judgments
will not induce any systemic change.'98 Be-
cause the supervisor of the officer and the
municipality are "not involved there will be lit-
tIe incentive to prevent violations of the fourth
amendment. Many studies have shown that
where liability is placed on the individual em-
ployee rather than on the large corporate de-
fendant, there is little deterrent effect.' 99 If
damages were placed on the federal govern-
ment, there would be at least theoretically an
incentive to decrease the damages imposed on
the municipality by improving training and su-
pervision. Additionally, if damages are imposed
because of the actions of the same official on a
number of occasions, there would be an incen-
tive to take direct disciplinary action against
the officer by the way of fine, suspension, or
elimination.
The motivation of the individual officer in
supporting his family by working in law en-
forcement becomes significant when the threat
of financial liability adversely affects, his job
performance. 200 It is possible that he will not
zealously perform his duties. It also seems un-
REv. CODE §§ 4.92.010-4.96.020 (1970 and Supp.
1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 15.14 (1965).
l98 Little, The Exclusionary Rule of Evidence
as a Means of Enforcing Fourth Amendment Mo-
rality on Police, 3 IND. L.F. 375, 406 (1970);
Kates & Kouba, supra note 70, at 140-41; Note,
Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Congressional
Assault on Mapp v. Ohio, 61 Geo. L.J. 1453,
1465 (1973); Note, Developing Governmental Lia-
bility Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MIrN. L. RE.v
1201, 1209 (1971). But see Paulsen, The Exclu-
sionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J.
Calm. L.C. & P.S. 255, 261 (1961); Plumb, Ille-
gal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q.
337, 387 (1939). This may be an added cost of
law enforcement which the public is willing to
bear. Another reason why there must be a systemic
approach.
' 99 Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Ol-
cial Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Dam-
age Actions, 53 Gao. L.J. 889 (1965).
200Id. at 907. This objection was raised by
Congressman Wiggins when he stated that the
remedy against the law enforcement agent is not
exclusive. This possibility of liability may result in
"overly excessive caution." 120 CoNG. REc. 1401
(daily ed. Mar. 5, 1974). This shortcoming would
be eliminated if H.R. 10439, § 4, 93d Cong. 2d Sess.
had been enacted. Hearings on HR. 10439 Before
the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Rela-
tions of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1974).
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just to penalize an officer financially for the
performance of his tasks. This is particularly
true where liability might be imposed for mere
negligence or the failure to exercise "reason-
able judgment." But this line of reasoning
would not hold true where liability is imposed
for intentional violations of an individual's
rights.20 1 If individual liability does become a
part of everyday life, it is possible that public
service will be reduced.
The public has an interest in encouraging
the right to privacy on one hand and aggres-
sive law enforcement on the other, yet, under
the amendment neither is achieved. Privacy
will be encouraged only if the rule deters po-
lice misconduct, but the amendment does not
accomplish this. From the perspective of the
officer, if the rules vary from state to state, the
rules will be hopelessly complex and confusing,
thus serving as a guide to few. Aggressive law
enforcement may be discouraged because the
remedy against the federal government is not
an exclusive remedy, and the officer will remain
personally liable. In fact the plaintiff may be
expected to sue both the individual police
officer and the federal government. Addition-
ally, where action is brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the individual plaintiff may
use the civil rules of discovery, and since, in
many cases, they are broader than the criminal
discovery rules, significant delay in any crimi-
nal trail of the defendant can be expected.
Last, and most importantly, damages may be
awarded in only a limited number of cases.
Where they are awarded they will probably be
so minimal that they will be considered as
merely an acceptable cost of law enforcement.
The failure of the amendment to allow punitive
or exemplary damages precludes its real effec-
tiveness. In sum, the amendment is dangerous
if seen as a substitute for the rule; it could be
interpreted by law enforcement officers as a
signal to ignore court guidelines regarding
searches.
VI. THE AMENDMENT AS AN EXPERIMENr IN
CONTROL OF POLICE
'Both the courts and the administrative agen-
,cies should liberally construe the Act as it has
'been amended. The overall supervision of the
2 0 1 See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
URBAN POLICE FUNCTION 11 (1974 Draft).
FTCA rests with the Tort Section, Civil Law
Division, Department of Justice. It may be
that the chief of that section will apply the old
adages of "pay now and save later" and "you
must spend money to make money." By
construing the statute liberally in the question-
able areas so as to award damages, the Depart-
ment of Justice may in the long run save the
time and effort of the police, prosecution, and
the courts. Even construed narrowly, the
amendment provides a monetary remedy for
harm to person or property when officers, in
good faith, commit one of the listed torts.
Broadly construed by both courts and the
agencies authorized to pay claims, these
amendments can be regarded as a worthwhile
experiment in control of the law enforcement
structure.
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The amendment does contain several very
good features. Claims are easy to file and can
often be filed without the assistance of a law-
yer. Most are administratively handled and
thus avoid long court delays. All persons in-
jured by unlawful searches and seizures are
protected, not just those eventually brought to.
trial. And if the claim is administratively de-
nied, the trial is in federal court before a
judge alone, possibly allowing recovery for
even claimants with "dirty hands."
To have an impact on the police at lower
levels, however, the Act must be liberally con-
strued. Abuse of process, scope of authority,
and the discretionary function exception should
all be interpreted so as to allow recovery. Ac-
tions should be allowed even where the only
damages incurred are to intangible interests
such as privacy, mental and emotional equilib-
rium, and reputation. Violations of federal
laws and rules should be considered along with
state laws in determining whether a tort has
been committed. If the act is so construed, and
the agencies and judges are not niggardly with
damages, 20 3 law enforcement structures will be
pressured into controlling the police. To save
202Id. at 10. "(Current methods of review and
control of police activities] should be continually
reevaluated and changed when necessary to
achieve both effective control over the exercise of
police authority and the effective administration of
criminal justice."
203 Consider the fine. example set by the New
York Court of Claims, which recently awarded
$14,000 for fright, fear, shock, depression, loss of
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money, police administrators can be expected
to discipline offenders, and, more importantly,
administrators should be motivated to effect or-
ganizational changes, formulate needed rules,
upgrade training, utilize in-house counsel more
extensively, and select officers more carefully.
20 4
As a word of caution one should note that
liberal construction does not necessarily mean
construction by liberals or by judicial activists.
In this case, liberal construction requires only
that' the amendment be given the effect in-
tended by the Congress. However, the opportu-
nity to experiment with the remedy may be
lost because of the emotional and symbolic
value given to the rule. Staunch opponents of
the rule may seize upon the amendment as a
substitute for the exclusionary rule, even
though it is a very inadequate substitute. The
abolition of the rule, with no tested, effective,
established substitute could be a signal to the
law enforcement establishment that a return
to pre-Mapp practices is being encouraged. On
the other hand, staunch supporters of the ex-
clusionary rule may react against the amend-
ment as an attack on the rule and all for
which it stands. But even they should realize
that the rule by itself is not now sufficient.
VII. NEw LEGISLATION
This article examined the assumptions made
by the Supreme Court in applying the ex-
clusionary rule to state and federal criminal
trials. One of these primary assumptions is
that the rule is necessary to deter unlawful po-
lice misconduct. A corollary of this justifica-
tion is that by deterring illegal police miscon-
duct, the right to privacy of all individuals in
the United States will be enhanced. However,
only one study has concluded that the rule does
-not deter illegal police misconduct,20 5 and -the
conclusion reached during this study may not
be supported by its own statistics. Neverthe-
less, there are very practical reasons why the
rule does not deter illegal police misconduct.
-consortium of husband and loss of services of hus-
'band resulting from an illegal no-knock search.
Herman v. State, 357 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Ct. of Claims,
1974).
204 See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
URBAN POLICE FUNCTION 7-11 (1974 Draft);
Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Po-
lice, 52 Tzx. L. RZEv. 703 (1974).
205 Spiotto, supra note 26.
If the deterrence assumption is erroneous,
should the Court limit or abandon the rule
even though it is at least partially true that
there is no reasonable alternative to the rule?
The answer would seem to be no; regardless
of the changes in the alternatives since Mapp,
the Supreme Court would be ill-advised to
limit or abolish the exclusionary rule until
there is a reasonable alternative that will foster
the interests of the public, the police, and the
individual whose rights have been violated.
Now more than judicial action is required to
bring these reasonable alternatives into exist-
ence.
Better drafting of Public Law 93-253 would
have eliminated some apparent inconsisten-
cies.2 0 6 For example, the term "abuse of proc-
ess" should be eliminated and the term "illegal
search and seizure" should be substituted, thus
indicating the true intent of the legislature.
Congress could expand on the remedies in
the Federal Tort Claims Act by passing an
amendment to the Act that would specifically
eliminate many of the technical defenses now
available to the government in these types of
suits. Such an amendment should also provide
for substantial liquidated damages, 207 attorneys'
fees, punitive damages, and should not limit
damages to property or personal injury. Future
legislation should bar action against the indi-
vidual officer except when there has been an
intentional violation of the fourth amendment
for personal reasons not connected with the
scope of the officer's employment. On the state
level similar legislation should be enacted.
2 0-°
206 There are other minor problems that should
be covered in any new legislation: Does a federal
tort claim judgment act as a bar in a later suppres-
sion hearing? See 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (1970). Can
admissions used in a claims proceeding be later
used in a trial? Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 372 (1968), would seem to indicate no, but
the answer is less than settled. Are the wider civil
discovery rules applicable at the FTCA proceed-
ing, even though that procedure effectively allows
the wider discovery for the criminal case?
207 120 CONG. REC. 1401 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1974):
"[L]iquidated damages may be necessary for any
proper damages."
208 Much also needs to be done at the local
level. The municipalities should establish an effec-
tive police disciplinary review board. The majority
of the board should be composed of civilians ap-
pointed by the elected executive officer for a pe-
riod of 5-15 years. The enabling statute should
provide that these individuals may not be removed
except for misconduct. The complaint procedure
should provide a method whereby complaints may
1975]
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Unfortunately, rather than correcting the defi-
ciencies in the Act, a bill has been introduced
to overrule the Act.
20 9
Damages will not deter improper police ac-
tion in some situations. Thus, in any case
where there has been a patently outrageous
violation210 of an individual's right to privacy,
any evidence obtained should be inadmissible
in evidence, thus continuing the existence and
-application of the exclusionary rule in limited
circumstances. Absent such a violation the evi-
dence would be admissible.
If the recommended changes are adopted, the
be filed orally or in writing by the individual in-
jured or by a third party. This complaint will be
filed with the board itself who will conduct its own
investigation. The board will decide whether to dis-
-pose of the matter informally or to conduct public
hearings where the parties may be represented by
a spokesman. The board should possess subpoena
power that will enable it to call witnesses for the
public hearing or during the preliminary stage of
the investigation. If a finding of a violation of the
fourth amendment is reached, the board can take
appropriate disciplinary action including dismissing
the officer or suspending him from the police
force. The interests of the community under this
systemic approach would be protected.
209 H.R. 15925, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
210 Cf. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary
Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1046-49 (1974).
This standard would be similar to that adopted in
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
interest of the public in convicting the guilty
while at the same time protecting the right of
privacy will be satisfied. The limitation of the
exclusionary rule to outrageous violations of
constitutional rights should insure that reliable
evidence will not be excluded because of a sin-
gle inflexible rule and the imposition of gov-
ernmental liability should be an incentive to
prevent future illegal actions. The results will
be seen most immediately in police administra-
tion; expanded educational programs and re-
form in recruitment, selection, and police super-
vision should rapidly occur. If public liability
does not result in these changes, it will at least
spread the risk of loss where there has been
property damage and personal injury so that
no individual will face financial ruin. Relieving
the police officer of liability will ensure effec-
tive law enforcement and avoid any chilling
inhibitions on public service.
If these changes are made in the Federal
Tort Claims Act, a viable alternative to the ex-
clusionary rule will be created. The existence
of this alternative will enable us to eliminate
much police conduct which is unlawful while
at the same time not intefering with the
overall effectiveness of the criminal justice sys-
tem. The constable will not blunder, nor will
the criminal go free.
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